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1 Introduction
In the last years, the theory on international environmental agreements (IEA)
and the prospect of climate change has motivated many game theoretic stud-
ies, often focused on cooperation and core solutions.
The necessity of cooperation amongst the countries involved, if a social
optimum is to be achieved, has already been addressed in the literature
in terms of Game Theory concepts; see e.g. Barrett (2003), Finus (2001),
Flam (2006) and references therein for a review on these topics. With a
few exceptions this literature works with simple static models of pollution
despite the fact that many of the important environmental problems, as
climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer or the acid rain problem, are
caused by a stock pollutant. However, the stock of pollution may change in
the course of the game, as a result of a positive rate of natural decay and
emissions of the countries. Thus, the presence of a stock pollutant leads to
a dynamic game that is not strictly repeated.
In the framework of a deterministic cooperative game with a dynamic,
multi-regional integrated assessment model, Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003)
calculated the optimal path of abatement and aggregated discounted welfare
for each region. They apply the transfer scheme advocated by Chander and
Tulkens (1997) for the Climate Negotiation (CLIMNEG) World Simulation
Model (abbreviated as CWSM) with six regions or countries. The idea of
surplus sharing is used for determining the transfer scheme, and they compute
all possible partial agreement Nash equilibria. They found that allocation in
the full cooperation lies in the core of the emission abatement game under
this specific transfer scheme. Their CWSM derived from the seminal multi-
region economy-climate RICE (Regional Integrated model of Climate and
the Economy)model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
Germain, Toint, Tulkens, and de Zeeuw (2003) have addressed the issue
of how many countries will be interested in signing an IEA with stock pollu-
tant, adopting a cooperative game-theory approach. They extend the result
established by Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997) for flow pollutants to
the larger context of closed-loop (feedback) dynamic games with a stock pol-
lutant. In this context, cooperation is negotiated at each period but financial
transfers provide incentives to the countries that ensures the implementation
of the grand coalition at each period. Their model, thus yields a sequence
of full cooperative international agreements, so that full cooperation is also
achieved in a dynamic setting with a stock pollutant.
Another paper related with this issue using a cooperative game-theory
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approach is Petrosjan and Zaccour (2003). However, in this paper the authors
assume that all the countries decide to cooperate at the initial time-consistent
decomposition of each player’s total cost, as given by Shapley value, so that
the countries stick at each moment to the full cooperative solution agreed at
initial time, supposing that the global allocation problem has been solved.
Nevertheless, there are only a few attempts in the stock pollutant control
literature modelling that issue in a stochastic control framework.
Stochastic Programming is considered by Dechert and O’Donnell (2006)
in a particular application that explore some fundamental issues of the op-
timal level of pollution in a lake with competing uses, they show how the
model can be interpreted as an open loop dynamic game, where the con-
trol variables are the levels of phosphorus discharged into the watershed of
the lake, the state of the system is the accumulated level of phosphorus in
the lake and the random shock (a multiplicative noise factor on the control
variables of the players) is the rainfall that washes the phosphorus in the
lake.
The use of stochastic control models to develop climate-economy models
has been advocated by Haurie and Viguier (2003) to represent the possible
competition between Russia and China on the international market of carbon
emissions permits, their model includes a representation of the uncertainty
concerning the date of entry of developing countries on this market in the
form of an event tree. Also by Bahn, Haurie, and Malhame´ (2008), they show
how a piecewise deterministic stochastic control model, over an infinite time
horizon, can be used as a paradigm for the design of efficient climate policy,
their model recognizes the existing uncertainty concerning the true sensitivity
of climate, and the fact that the solution to the climate change issue may
reside in the introduction of new carbon-free technologies. Keller, Bolker, and
Bradford (2004) have already explored the combined effects of uncertainty
and learning about a climate threshold (an uncertain ocean thermohaline
circulation collapse) in an economic optimal growth model.
The stability of an International Environmental Agreement among n
countries that emit pollutant are studied using differential games, defined
in continuous time, by Jorgensen, Mart´ın-Herra´n, and Zaccour (2003) and
(2004), Rubio and Casino (2005), among others.
As far as we know, none stochastic formulation for the finite horizon dy-
namic analysis of international agreements on transnational pollution control
has been introduce as an extension of the issues presented in Germain, Toint,
Tulkens, and de Zeeuw (2003). We adopt this point of view because to con-
sider randomness on the factors in the model is closer to reality (see Casas
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and Romera (2005)).
The main purpose of this work is to suggest a stochastic dynamic game
formulation for the Stock Pollutant Control, for both cooperative and non
cooperative models. These models proposed are directly linked with the
Kyoto or post-Kyoto agreement mechanisms.
The stochastic formulation for this Stock Pollutant Control Model in-
volves the use of Stochastic Dynamic Programming with discrete and finite
planing horizon, for searching both cooperatives and non cooperatives equi-
libria. Stochastic optimization problems should be solved by Stochastic Dy-
namic Programming Techniques (see Bertsekas (2000)).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the interna-
tional stock pollutant model with its components, the cost functional compo-
nents and their elements, the underlaying Markov Decision Process (MDP),
and the description of the modes of countries behaviour. In Section 3, we
describe the international stock pollutant control cooperative model and we
solve the problem of minimize the expected discounted total cost for each
period of time and for all the countries jointly. An analysis of particular ex-
pected damages functions is included. In Section 4, we describe what happen
if the countries do not sign a voluntary international agreement and we solve
the non cooperative model. In Section 5, we present a numerical example
based on real scenarios borrowed from the work by Eyckmans and Tulkens
(2003). In Section 6, we present some conclusions and extensions of our work.
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2 Stock Pollutant Control Model
We adopt the point of view of the issues presented in Germain, Toint,
Tulkens, and de Zeeuw (2003).
In our model, we introduce a stochastic dynamic game formulation, with
finite and discrete planing horizon analysis of IEA on transnational pollution
control, as an extension of these issues.
Model Components
We consider a Markovian Game described by a tuple
G = {J, S, (Ei, ri)i∈J , p, T }
with the following elements
• There are n players and J = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the set of countries or
regions which we simplify refer to as countries in the sequel.
• S is a Borel subset of some Polish (i.e., complete, separable, metric)
countable and non empty space; is the state space of the game, with
typical element s. The state transition dynamics is a function of the
current state of the system and an additive noise factor on each period
of time. The state of the system is the accumulated level of pollution
in the atmosphere, given by st as stock of pollutant at each period t,
st ∈ S, according to the state equation
st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt , 1 ≤ t ≤ T (1)
Where
– s0 is the initial stock of pollutant or preindustrial level, given.
– δ is the pollutant’s natural rate of atmospheric absorption of CO2
between two periods of time, such that 0 < δ < 1.
• p specifies the law of motion (or transition probabilities) for the game
by associating with each (s, a) ∈ S × E a probability p(·|s, e) over the
Borel sets of S.
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• A finite planing horizon with discrete-time periods t, such that
t ∈ T = {1, 2, ..., T} ⊂ Z+.
• The control variables are et = (e1t; e2t; ...; ent)
′ vector of the different
countries emissions of pollutant at each period t, entailed by economic
activity, where eit ∈ E and E is the countable and non empty overall
action space, and
E =
⋃
s∈S
E(s),
where E(s) is the set of admissible actions (emissions), when the system
is in each state (pollutant level) s. For each s ∈ S the set E(s) is finite.
• The random disturbance ξt is a noise process: a sequence of i.i.d. ran-
dom variables and independent of the initial state s0, with
E [ξt] = 0, σ
2 = E
[
ξ2t
]
< ∞, ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1. (2)
We consider stock of pollutant in a wide sense, not restricted to the car-
bon dioxide (CO2) stock level. Inclusion of manifold pollutants is important.
To wit, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change limits aggregate emissions of six direct greenhouse gases, such as:
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluoro-
carbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)), as
well for the indirect greenhouse gases such as SO2, NOx, CO and/or micro
particles of industrial pollution (between 0.1 y 2.5 µ-meters). The emissions
are aggregated and considered as CO2 equivalents.
Functional Cost Components
Following Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001) among many others, we assume that
the emissions are proportional to production. Additionally we consider
• Future costs are discounted by the constant and positive discount factor
β with 0 < β ≤ 1.
• ci(eit) : function that measures in monetary terms the total cost in-
curred by country i ∈ J at period t ∈ T from limiting its own industrial
emissions to eit; is a differentiable, decreasing (c
′
i < 0) and strictly con-
vex function (c′′i > 0).
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• di(st) : function that measures in monetary terms the damages caused
by the stock of pollutant st during the time period t for the i-th country;
is a differentiable, increasing (d′i > 0) and convex function (d
′′
i ≥ 0).
• ri(eit, st) = ci(eit) + di(st) : function that measures in monetary terms
the total cost incurred by country i ∈ J from limiting its emissions to
eit, and the damages caused by the stock of pollutant st during the
time period t for the i-th country; rit ∈ R, where R is the cost set and
R is a subset of R.
We consider that the only way to control the stock of pollution is through
the control of emissions, that is reducing pollution is done through the re-
duction of emissions, and not through the cleaning of the environment. The
marginal cost ci of reducing emissions is higher for lower levels of emissions.
The decreasing character of the cost functions ci show the evident phe-
nomenon of the increasing costs related to the emissions reduction, i.e. The
increasing cost to decrease the emissions could be associated with filter in-
stallations or the use of other techniques.
The underlaying Markov Decision Process
We considere by MDP a Markov Decision Process together with an optimal-
ity criteria. The problems considered in this work are discrete-time, finite-
horizon and stationary MDP with expected total reward. Then, we can
express the elements of our random scenarios through the following MDP
Γ = (S,E,R, P, β),
where the state space S and the overall action space E =
⋃
s∈S E(s) are both
countable and nonempty, E(s) is the set of admissible actions (emissions),
when the system is in each state (pollutant level) s. For each s ∈ S the set
E(s) is finite. The cost set R is a bounded countable subset of R. For each
t ≥ 1, let st, et and rt denote the state (pollutant level) of the system, the
action (emissions) taken by the decision maker (pays), and the cost incurred
at period of time t, respectively.
The stationary, single-stage, conditional transition probabilities are de-
fined by
pei,j,r := Prob (st+1 = j, rt = r/st = i, et = e) ,
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∀i, j ∈ S , e ∈ E(i) , r ∈ R , t ≥ 1,
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pei,j,r = 1 , i ∈ S , e ∈ E(i).
Modes of countries behavior
The damages in each country’s environment depend on the emissions of pol-
lutant of all different countries at each time-period t that contribute to a
stock st.
In cooperative form the countries jointly choose at each period its emis-
sions levels in order to minimize the expected total discount costs, then the
resulting trajectories of emissions and stock constitute the international op-
timum.
In non-cooperative form, each country considers only the damages of
the stock of pollutant over itself. In the sense of a Nash equilibrium, the
countries minimize, at each period, only its own expected discounted costs,
with knowledge of the emissions vector ejt, with j 6= i, of the other countries.
3 Cooperative Model
In this case, one assumes that the countries behave in an internationally
optimal way, i.e. that each of them takes account of the impact of its own
industrial pollution not only on itself but on all other countries as well. It is
clear that the damages to the environment of country i will depend on the
emissions of all countries. We solve the problem of minimize the expected
discounted total cost for each period t ∈ T , where T is a discrete and finite
set, and for all the countries jointly (P1)
(P1) min
{eit}
E
[
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt [ci(eit) + di(st)]
]
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, · · · , n; ∀t = 1, · · · , T
s0 > 0
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Remark The resulting family of trajectories of emissions (policies) e∗it for
all players i ∈ J determined together with the resulting stock s∗t , constitute
the international optimum for all periods t ∈ T or a cooperative equilibrium
(see Dutta and Sundaram (1998)).
Note that the objective function in the model (P1) is equivalent to
min
{eit}
E
[
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt [ci(eit) + di(st)]
]
⇔ min
{eit}
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt (ci(eit) + E [di(st)]) (3)
Proposition 1. Problem (P1) has an equilibrium {e∗it}.
Proof. The convexity of the functions ci(eit) and di(st), for all i ∈ J and
for all periods t ∈ T , suffices to guarantee that the minimum exists and is
unique (see for instance, Puterman (2005) or Herna´ndez-Lerma (1999)).
This problem (P1) can be solved by using Stochastic Dynamic Program-
ming tools. The expected value function W , according to Bellman’s principle
of optimality, satisfies the Dynamic Programming equations for (P1)
(P1.1) W (T, sT−1) = min
eiT
E
[
n∑
i=1
(ci(eiT ) + di(sT ))
]
,
(P1.2) W (t, st−1) = min
eit
E
[
n∑
i=1
[ci(eit) + di(st)] + βW (t + 1, st)
]
,
∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ J
s0 > 0
The stochastic Dynamic Programming equations (P1.1) and (P1.2) are
equivalent, respectively, to
(P1.1) ⇔ W (T, sT−1) = min
eiT
{
n∑
i=1
(ci(eiT ) + E [di(sT )])
}
(P1.2) ⇔ W (t, st−1) = min
eit
{
n∑
i=1
(ci(eit) + E [di(st)]) + βW (t + 1, st)
}
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If countries cooperate, they jointly solve (P1.1) at final period of time T ,
the country i’s expected total cost is
Wi(T, s) = ci(e
∗
iT ) + di(s
∗
T ),
where e∗iT = {e
∗
1T , e
∗
2T , . . . , e
∗
nT} is the vector of optimal emission levels or
policy, and s∗T denotes the resulting stock of pollutant at final period T ,
given
s∗T = [1− δ]s +
n∑
i=1
e∗iT
where s is the inherited stock of pollutant at the begin of period T .
In earlier periods, if countries cooperate they solve the problem (P1.2) for
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Optimal levels of emissions and resulting stock of pollutant
are denoted by e∗it and s
∗
t respectively.
Then let denotes the country i’s expected discounted equilibrium cost by
Wi(t, s) = ci(e
∗
it) + di(s
∗
t ) + βWi(t + 1, s
∗
t ), ∀t = 1, · · · , T − 1
with
s∗t = [1− δ]s +
n∑
i=1
e∗it
where s is the inherited stock of pollutant at the begin of period t.
Let define as τ -expected discounted total cost by
W τi ≡
τ∑
t=1
Wi(t, s
∗
t−1), 1 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1
and total cost Wi ≡
T∑
t=1
Wi(t, s
∗
t−1).
3.1 Cooperative Alternative Problem
We present an equivalent cooperative problem which can be solved by using
Linear Programming tools.
The recurrence equation (1), of the contamination stock st, gives a dy-
namic character to the cooperative model also to the non cooperative model,
but, using the recurrence expression, considering the state variables st and
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the control variables eit as decision variables, and the state equations as
equality restrictions, besides having as an objective function a differentiable
convex function, we may write an associated model, writing st as a function
of the known initial stock s0, of the emissions eit from each country i ∈ J ,
and of the random disturbance vector ξt in each period of time t ∈ T .
From the recurrence equation (1) we obtain
s1 = (1− δ)s0 +
n∑
i=1
ei1 + ξ1.
s2 = (1− δ)
2s0 + (1− δ)
n∑
i=1
ei1 + (1− δ)ξ1 +
n∑
i=1
ei2 + ξ2.
s3 = (1− δ)
3s0 + (1− δ)
2
n∑
i=1
ei1 + (1− δ)
2ξ1 +
+(1− δ)
n∑
i=1
ei2 + (1− δ)ξ2 +
n∑
i=1
ei3 + ξ3.
By induction we get
st = (1− δ)
ts0 + (1− δ)
t−1
n∑
i=1
ei1 + (1− δ)
t−1ξ1 + · · ·+
+ · · ·+ (1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ + (1− δ)
t−τξτ + · · ·+
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt.
Recursively we obtain the general form
st = (1− δ)
ts0 +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ .
Explicitly developing the previous recurrence equation, we obtain the
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following system of restrictions
s1 = (1− δ)s0 + e11 + e21 + · · ·+ en1 + ξ1.
s2 = (1− δ)
2s0 + (1− δ)e11 + (1− δ)e21 + · · ·+
+(1− δ)en1 + (1− δ)ξ1 + e12 + · · ·+ en2 + ξ2.
s3 = (1− δ)
3s0 + (1− δ)
2e11 + · · ·+ (1− δ)
2en1 + (1− δ)
2ξ1 +
+(1− δ)e12 + · · ·+ (1− δ)en2 + (1− δ)ξ2 + e13 + · · ·+ en3 + ξ3.
...
st = (1− δ)
ts0 + (1− δ)
t−1e11 + · · ·+ (1− δ)
t−1en1 + (1− δ)
t−1ξ1 + · · ·+
+(1− δ)t−2e12 + · · ·+ (1− δ)
t−2en2 + (1− δ)
t−2ξ2 + · · ·+ (1− δ)e1t−1
+ · · ·+ (1− δ)ent−1 + (1− δ)ξt−1 + e1t + · · ·+ ent + ξt.
By using the Markov’s condition or the Property of causality,
∀j, r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} with j < r, it is shown that the state xr only
depends on the state xj and the intermediate controls {uj, uj+1, . . . , ur−1}.
Then, we conclude that the actual contamination stock depends on the initial
stock s0 and the set of controls or emission vector e1, e2, ..., eT for each period
of time t ∈ T .
Note that, by definition eit ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T , and st ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T
provided that 0 < δ < 1.
Then, we can consider equivalently the following problem with convex
objective function and T + 1 linear constraints
min
{eit}t∈T
E
[
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt
[
ci(eit) + d˜i(s0, eit, ξt)
]]
s.t. Ae = b− ξ
e ≥ 0
s0 > 0
where
e′ = (e11; e21; · · · ; en1; e12; e22; · · · ; en2; · · · ; e1T ; e2T ; · · · ; enT )
b′ =
(
−(1− δ)s0;−(1− δ)
2s0; · · · ;−(1− δ)
T s0
)
ξ′ =
(
ξ1; (1− δ)ξ1 + ξ2; . . . ; . . . ; (1− δ)
T−1ξ1 + (1− δ)
T−2ξ2 + · · ·+ ξT
)
The independent vector b and random disturbance vector ξ are of order
T .
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The matrix A is a T × Tn, lower triangular matrix, with the following
structure
A =


1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
(1− δ) · · · (1− δ) 1 · · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 0
(1− δ)2 · · · (1− δ)2 (1− δ) · · · (1− δ) · · · 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
(1− δ)T−1 · · · (1− δ)T−1 (1− δ)T−2 · · · (1− δ)T−2 · · · 1 · · · 1


By using the development presented in this section one can find the so-
lutions e∗it of optimal emissions for each country i ∈ J , and one obtains the
stock levels of contamination s∗t in each period of time t = 1, 2, ..., T .
3.2 Analysis of particular Damage Functions
Note that although the cost function ci, depends only on the emissions eit of
each country i ∈ J at each period of time t ∈ T , the damages function di
depends on the initial stock s0, the emissions of the each one others countries
eit with i 6= j, the emissions eit and the random disturbance ξt, for each period
of time t. This fact determines the stochastic structure of the objective
function to be considered in the optimization problem (P1), as it is shown
in (3).
We analyze useful cases of damage functions that appear in the economic
literature, and we present the particular programming problems to be solved
in each case. This analysis remains valid for both models, cooperative and
non cooperative with some slight modification.
3.2.1 Linear Case
One assume
di(st) = ast + b, a, b ∈ R.
Following (3) the objective function of the cooperative model (P1) has
the following form
min
{eit}
{
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt (ci(eit) + aE [di(st)])
}
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because
E [di(st)] = E [ast + b] ,
= aE [st] + b,
= aE
[
(1− δ)ts0 +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
]
+ b,
= a
[
(1− δ)ts0 +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ + E[
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ ]
]
+ b,
= a
[
(1− δ)ts0 +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ
]
+ b.
Then the objective function of model (P1) is equal to the objective func-
tion of the following linear programming
min
{eit}
{
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt
(
ci(eit) + a(1− δ)
ts0 + a
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ + b
)}
.
3.2.2 Quadratic Case
One assume that
di(st) = (st)
2 .
The objective function of the cooperative model has the following form
min
{eit}
{
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt
(
ci(eit) + E
[
(st)
2])} .
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then
E
[
(st)
2
]
= E

((1− δ)ts0 + t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
)2 ,
= E

ϕ2 +
(
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
)2
+ 2ϕ
(
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
) ,
= ϕ2 + E

( t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
)2+ 2ϕE
[
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
]
.
where
ϕ = (1− δ)ts0 +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ .
Provided that {ξt} are iid and condition (2), we have
E

( t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
)2 = E

 t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)2(t−τ)ξ2τ + 2
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
t∑
j=1
(1− δ)t−jξj

 ,
=
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)2(t−τ)E
[
ξ2τ
]
+ 2
t∑
τ=1
t∑
j=1
(1− δ)t−τ (1− δ)t−jE [ξτξj ] ,
=
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)2(t−τ)σ2t ,
then E
[
(st)
2
]
= ϕ2 +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)2(t−τ)σ2t .
Then in this case, our problem is transformed in an quadratic programming
problem.
3.2.3 Exponential Case
Finally, one assume
di(st) = exp(st).
The objective function of the cooperative model has the following form
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min
{eit}
{
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt (ci(eit) + E [exp(st)])
}
.
Now
E [exp(st)] = E
[
exp
(
(1− δ)ts0
)
exp
(
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ
)
exp
(
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
)]
= exp
(
(1− δ)ts0
)
exp
(
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ
)
E
[
exp
(
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
)]
where
E
[
exp
(
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ
)]
=
t∏
τ=1
E
[
exp(1− δ)t−τξτ
]
,
=
t∏
τ=1
ϕξ
[
(1− δ)t−τ
]
.
We recognize ϕξ as the z-transformed function if ξ follows a discrete random
variable.
Depending on the expression of this ϕξ function, we get different types of objec-
tive functions, and therefore different types of mathematic programming problems,
usually they will be non-linear optimization problems.
4 Non-Cooperative Model
In an alternative mode of behaviour, we describe what would happen if the coun-
tries do not sign a voluntary international environmental agreement. One may
assume that countries behave non cooperatively in the sense of Nash equilibrium,
where each of them minimizes at each period only its own discounted costs, tak-
ing given the emissions of the other countries. A Nash equilibrium is a family
of strategies, one for each player, that minimize every country i’s cost, given the
strategies of all other players j 6= i. In such an equilibrium, no individual country
has an incentive to deviate as long as the other countries stick to their equilibrium
strategies.
The considered problem is a dynamic game in discrete time and finite horizon
with only one player or country. We can adopt the perspective of an Optimal
Control Problem (OCP), where the dynamic model is a system in discrete time
st+1 = φ(st, et, ξt) for all t ∈ T with initial condition s0 and finite horizon T < ∞.
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Formally, there are n problems to solve. Actually, at each period of time t ∈ T ,
each country i ∈ J solves the following problem (P2)
(P2) min
{eiτ}τ∈{t,...,T}
E
[
T∑
τ=t
βτ [ci(eiτ ) + di(sτ )]
]
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T ; ∀i ∈ J
s0 > 0
Note that the objective function in the model (P2) is equivalent to
min
{eiτ}τ∈{t,...,T}
E
[
T∑
τ=t
βτ [ci(eiτ ) + di(sτ )]
]
⇔ min
{eiτ}τ∈{t,...,T}
T∑
τ=t
βτ (ci(eiτ ) + E [di(sτ )])
Proposition 2. Problem (P2) has an equilibrium {eNit }.
Proof. A particular case the convexity of the functions ci(eit) and di(st), for all
i ∈ J and for all periods t ∈ T , suffices to guarantee that the Nash equilibrium
exists and is unique (see for instance, Puterman (2005) and Herna´ndez-Lerma
(1999)).
The expected value functions Ni, according to Bellman’s principle of optimality,
can be found by solving the Stochastic Dynamic Programming equations for (P2)
(P2.1) Ni(T, sT−1) = min
eiT
E [ci(eiT ) + di(sT )]
(P2.2) Ni(t, st−1) = min
eit
E [ci(eit) + di(st) + βNi(t + 1, st)]
∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ J
s0 > 0
Remark The resulting family of trajectories of emissions (policies) eNit deter-
mined for each country i ∈ J , together with the resulting stock sNt , constitute a
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non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for all periods t ∈ T (see Dutta and Sundaram
(1998)).
The Stochastic Dynamic Programming equations (P2.1) and (P2.2) are equiv-
alent, respectively, to
(P2.1) ⇔ Ni(T, sT−1) = min
eiT
ci(eiT ) + E [di(sT )] ,
(P2.2) ⇔ Ni(t, st−1) = min
eit
ci(eit) + E [di(st)] + βNi(t + 1, st).
In the non cooperative equilibrium the country i’s expected total cost at period
final T is
Ni(T, s) = ci(e
N
iT ) + di(s
N
T ) ; s
N
T = [1− δ]s +
n∑
i=1
eNiT .
where eNiT = {e
N
1T , e
N
2T , . . . , e
N
nT } is the vector that denotes the emissions equilib-
rium level and sNT denotes the resulting stock of pollutant at final period of time
T , where s is the inherited stock of pollutant at the begin of period T .
Let define as τ -expected discounted total cost by
N τi ≡
τ∑
t=1
Ni(t, s
N
t−1), 1 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1
and total cost Ni ≡
T∑
t=1
Ni(t, s
N
t−1).
4.1 Non-Cooperative Alternative Problem
By the recurrence equation (1) and considering that each country minimizes its
own costs, given the emissions vector ejt, with j 6= i, of the all others countries
and considering the random disturbance vector ξt in each period of time t ∈ T ,
for each country i ∈ J we obtain that
s1 = (1− δ)s0 + ei1 +
n∑
j 6=i
ej1 + ξ1.
s2 = (1− δ)
2s0 + (1− δ)ei1 + (1− δ)
n∑
j 6=i
ej1 + (1− δ)ξ1 + ei2 +
n∑
j 6=i
ej2 + ξ2.
s3 = (1− δ)
3s0 + (1− δ)
2ei1 + (1− δ)
2
n∑
j 6=i
ej1 + (1− δ)
2ξ1 + (1− δ)ei2 +
+(1− δ)
n∑
j 6=i
ej2 + (1− δ)ξ2 + ei3 +
n∑
j 6=i
ej3 + ξ3.
18
Proceeding in a similar way by induction till the moment t, we get to the
following expression
st = (1− δ)
ts0 + (1− δ)
t−1ei1 + (1− δ)
t−1
n∑
j 6=i
ej1 + (1− δ)
t−1ξ1 + · · ·+
+(1− δ)t−τeit + (1− δ)
t−τ
n∑
j 6=i
ejτ + (1− δ)
t−τξτ + · · ·+ eit +
n∑
j 6=i
ejt + ξt,
in general form
st = (1− δ)
ts0 +
t∑
τ=1
n∑
j 6=i
(1− δ)t−τejτ +
t∑
τ=1
eiτ +
t∑
i=1
(1− δ)t−τξi.
Explicitly developing the previous recurrence equation (1), the constraints sys-
tem is transformed obtaining
s1 = (1− δ)s0 + e11 + e21 + · · ·+ en1 + ξ1,
s2 = (1− δ)
2s0 + (1− δ)e11 + (1− δ)e21 + · · ·
+(1− δ)en1 + (1− δ)ξ1 + e12 + · · ·+ en2 + ξ2,
s3 = (1− δ)
3s0 + (1− δ)
2e11 + · · ·+ (1− δ)
2en1 + (1− δ)
2ξ1 + (1− δ)e12 +
+ · · ·+ (1− δ)en2 + (1− δ)ξ2 + e13 + · · ·+ en3 + ξ3,
...
st = (1− δ)
ts0 + (1− δ)
t−1e11 + · · ·+ (1− δ)
t−1en1 + (1− δ)
t−1ξ1 + · · ·
+(1− δ)t−2e12 + · · ·+ (1− δ)
t−2eEn2 + (1− δ)
t−2ξ2 + · · ·
+(1− δ)e1t−1 + · · ·+ (1− δ)ent−1 + (1− δ)ξt−1 + e1t + · · ·+ ent + ξt.
In the non cooperative case we have n problems to solve, one for each country
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Let i fixed, then
min
{et}t∈{1,...,T}
E
[
T∑
t=1
βt
[
ci(et) + d˜i(s0, et, ξt)
]]
s.a. Bie = bi + ξ
e ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
s0 > 0
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where
e′i = (ei1; ei2; · · · ; eiT )
b′i = (bi1; bi2; · · · ; biT )
bit = −(1− δ)
ts0 −
t∑
τ=1
n∑
j 6=i
(1− δ)t−τejτ
ξ′ =
(
ξ1; (1− δ)ξ1 + ξ2; . . . ; . . . ; (1− δ)
T−1ξ1 + (1− δ)
T−2ξ2 + · · ·+ ξT
)
The matrix Bi is a square matrix, lower triangular, of order T , with ones in
the principal diagonal. The vector b and the random disturbance ξ have order T .
The structure of the matrix Bi is as follows
Bi =


1 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
(1− δ) 1 0 0 0 · · · 0
(1− δ)2 (1− δ) 1 0 0 · · · 0
(1− δ)3 (1− δ)2 (1− δ) 1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
(1− δ)T−1 (1− δ)T−2 (1− δ)T−3 · · · · · · (1− δ) 1


then we can may obtain the inverse matrix of the matrix Bi, which is quasi
diagonal
B−1i =


1 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
−(1− δ) 1 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 −(1− δ) 1 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 −(1− δ) 1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
0 0 0 · · · · · · −(1− δ) 1


As in the cooperative model solution, by using the development presented in
this section one can find the parameters eNit of optimal emissions for each country
i ∈ J , and one obtains the stock levels of contamination sNt in each period of time
t = 1, 2, ..., T .
Note that the particular analysis for linear, quadratic and exponential damage
functions developed in section 3.2.1, holds for the non cooperative case with little
change in the objective function.
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5 A Numerical Example
In the following, we show some numerical results obtained by application of the
algorithms developed in the preceding sections of cooperative (P1) and non coop-
erative (P2) problems to a real scenario considering six regions or countries. The
six regions or countries considered are USA, Japan, European Union (EU), China,
Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Rest of the World (ROW). Periods of time are
years, the initial period 0 refers to year 1990, following the Kyoto Protocol.
The model and the values of the parameters used are based on the paper
by Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003). In that paper the model named the Climate
Negotiation (CLIMNEG) World Simulation Model, is considered as well as a deter-
ministic dynamic analysis about how many countries will be interesting in signing
an international environmental agreement (IEA) with accumulating pollutant in
discrete time. All computations were made by use of the software Matlab 7.3.0
(R2006b).
5.1 Model and parameters
The temperature change equation is taken from the climate economy model RICE
(Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy) by Nordhaus and Yang
(1996) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), as well as most of the parameter values
and all basic data on GDP, population, capital stock, carbon emissions and con-
centration and global mean temperature. A complete overview of the equations
and parameter values of the Climate Negotiation (CLIMNEG) World Simulation
Model (abbreviated as CWSM) can be found in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003).
The division of the world is the same as in the RICE model. There are 6
countries or regions: USA, Japan, European Union (EU), China, Former Soviet
Union (FSU) and Rest of the World (ROW). The time is divided in years, the
initial period (period t = 0) refers to year 1990. To take account on the long term
impacts of stock pollutant, we take a long planning horizon of 100 years, but we
will only consider results until 2030 in order to avoid boundary problems.
The CO2 emissions in each region or country i ∈ J at period of time t ∈ T are
denoted by eit, with eit ≥ 0 for all i ∈ J and for all t ∈ T , and et = (e1t; e2t; ...; ent)
is the corresponding vector of emissions of CO2 in each of n regions or countries i
at period of time t. Emissions of region i at time t are considered due to economic
activity and proportional to the potential GDP named Yit, according to expression
eit = σit(1− ηit)Yit (4)
The optimal abatement rate of control of emissions, in each country or region
i and in every period of time t, is the endogenous vector ηt = (η1t; η2t; ...; ηnt) with
0 ≤ ηit ≤ 1, for all i ∈ J and for all t ∈ T . Note that ηt = 0 for all t determines
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the “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario in this model, i.e. a trajectory in which
the emissions are not reduced with respect to their maximum values.
The emissions of CO2 to output ratio σit, of each country or region i at each
period of time t, declines exogenously over time t due to an assumed autonomous
energy efficiency increase. Given eit and Yit, and the BAU scenario, one may
obtains
σi,t =
eit
Yit
.
The potential GDP denoted by Yit is the output(exogenous) of country or
region i at period of time t, in billion 1990 USA dollars, and git is the annual
growth rates of each country or region i at each period of time t.
Yi,t+1 = (1 + git)Yit. (5)
The next equation modelizes the stock pollutant part of the model.
The emissions contribute to the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere, in billion tons
of carbon CO2, according to equation (1)
st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt, ∀t = 1, ...T.
or equivalently
st = (1− δ)
ts0 +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τ
n∑
i=1
eiτ +
t∑
τ=1
(1− δ)t−τξτ .
where the initial stock or preindustrial level of the CO2 atmospheric stock, is
taken as 590 billion tons of carbon equivalent.
The parameter δ, such that 0 < δ < 1, the rate of decay or absorption of
CO2 in the atmosphere between two periods of time t and t − 1, is assumed as
δ = 0.0833 per decade or δ = 0.0909512 per year.
The random disturbance ξt is a noise process as in (2), i.e. sequence of i.i.d.
random variables and independent of the initial state s0, with normal distribution
and
E [ξt] = 0, σ
2 = E
[
ξ2t
]
= 1, ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1.
In our simulations we have estimate the expectation of the damages functions over
100 runs carried out after the corresponding 100 values of the standard normal
disturbance ξt.
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The stock s influences in turn the variation of atmospheric temperature w.r.t.
its preindustrial or initial level s0, according to the following equations
∆Tt = γ ln
(
st
s0
)
,
where the annual discount rate γ is an exogenous positive parameter. This param-
eter is calibrated such that a doubling of CO2 atmospheric concentration results
in an increase of temperature of 2.5 degrees with respect to its preindustrial level,
and we take its value as
γ =
2.5
ln(2)
.
The next two equations describe the economic part of the model, i.e. the costs
cit of reducing the emissions of CO2 on the one hand, and the costs of the damages
dit due to stock pollutant and climate change on the other.
The abatement cost function cit of country i at each period of time t, measured
in billion 1990 USA dollars, is given by
cit(eit) = ai1η
ai2
it Yit = ai1
[
1−
eit
σitYit
]ai2
Yit,
where the functions cit are decreasing (c
′
it < 0) and strictly convex (c
′′
it > 0), as is
assumed in Section 2.
Damages due to stock pollutant and climate change are assumed to follow
from the increase of the atmospheric temperature, in billion 1990 USA dollars,
according to
dit(st) = bi1∆T
bi2
t Yit = bi1
[
γ ln
(
st
s0
)]bi2
Yit, (6)
where the functions dit are increasing (d
′
it > 0) and convex (d
′′
it > 0), according to
the hypotheses of the model in Section 2.
The regional parameter values ai1, ai2, bi1 and bi2 for all countries i ∈ J are
exogenous and positive. These regional parameter values, characterizing damage
functions dit and abatement cost functions cit, are derived from Eyckmans and
Tulkens (2003), and are given in Table 1.
We now describe the exogenous parameters appearing in the problems (P1)
and (P2). The initial output Yit, i.e. 1990 potential GDP, of the different region
or countries are given by the vector
Y1990 = [5464.796, 2932.055, 6828.042, 370.024, 855.207, 4628.621],
expressed in billion 1990 USA dollars and the total of the world, at this year, is
21078.750 billions USA dollars.
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Table 1: Regional parameter values per country
i USA JAP EU CHI FSU ROW
ai1 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.1
ai2 2.887 2.887 2.887 2.887 2.887 2.887
bi1 0.01102 0.01174 0.01174 0.015523 0.00857 0.02093
bi2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
The average annual output growth rates git in per cent for each country at
each period of time t, given in Table 2, are calculated from Kverndokk (1994).
After (5) it is possible to evaluate Yit for all i ∈ J and for all t ∈ T , the cumulative
output of region or country i during the period of time t.
Table 2: Average annual output growth rates git in %, per country for each
period of time t (per decade)
period t USA JAP EU CHI FSU ROW
1990-2000 2.60 2.20 2.20 4.60 2.60 3.70
2000-2020 2.20 1.70 1.70 4.40 2.10 3.40
2020-2050 1.60 1.30 1.30 3.40 1.60 2.70
2050-2080 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.50
2080-2110 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
We face now the calculation of the initial value σ1990 for the optimization
problem.
The initial CO2 vector of emissions e1990, in absence of any control are taken
from the RICE model and these emissions are measured in billion tons of carbon.
e1990 = [1.37, 0.29, 0.872, 0.805, 1.066, 3.43]
Given e1990 and the annual GDP Y1990 value, following (4) we obtain the initial
emissions of CO2 to output ratio σ1990
σ1990 = [0.0002506, 0.0000989, 0.0001277, 0.0021755, 0.0012464, 0.000741]
Given e1990 and the annual emissions growth rates git, following (5) it is easy
to calculate the output ratio σit for all country i ∈ J and for all period of time
t ∈ T , that is the CO2 emission/output ratio of region or country i during the
period of time t.
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In this example we borrow the output Yit and CO2 emission/output ratio time
series from different versions of the RICE model, developed by Nordhaus and Yang
(1996) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
Finally the discount factor per year, that appears in the objective functions of
problems (P1) and (P2) is taken as
β =
1
(1 + ρ)1
= 0.98
where the annual discount rate is chosen as ρ = 0.02.
5.2 The Numerical Results
In this subsection we present the reference scenario which corresponds to the values
of the parameters given in the last subsection. The simulations are made for a time
horizon of 100 years, but we give the results only up to 2030, i.e. for the first 40
years, in order to avoid boundary problems.
Figure 1: Optimal cooperative emissions e∗it for each country at each period
of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
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We have implemented the equivalent formulation of problems (P1) and (P2)
given in Subsections 3.1 and 4.1, respectively. The damages function (6) considered
in our example, is more complex than the particular cases analyzed in Section 3.2.
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Thus, we have developed specific code for our example. All the tables are included
in the Appendix.
Note that the optimal abatement rates for each country can be directly ob-
tained after the optimal emissions by applying (4). This is in fact one of the
outputs more frequently analyzed by the economic literature concerning stock pol-
lutant control.
Table 3 gives the optimal cooperative emissions e∗it in billion tons of CO2
equivalent for each country during each period of time t. These results are related
with problem (P1). The last row gives the cumulated emissions per country until
the end of the horizon T in billion tons of carbon. Figure 1 shows the optimal
cooperative emissions e∗it for each country i and per each period of time t.
Figure 2: Optimal Cooperative Value Function Wit per country i for each
period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
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Table 4 gives the optimal cooperative value function Wit for each country
during each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars. These results are
related with problem (P1). The last row gives the cumulated value function per
country and the total of the world at the end of the final period T , measured
in billions of 1990 USA dollars. Figure 2 shows the optimal cooperative value
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function Wit for each country i and per each period of time t in billions of 1990
USA dollars.
Figure 3: Optimal non cooperative emissions eNit per each country for each
period of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
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Table 5 gives the optimal non cooperative emissions eNit per country i during
the period of time t. These results are related with problem (P2). The last row
gives the cumulated emissions per country i until the end of the period of time T
in billion tons of carbon. Figure 3 shows the optimal non cooperative emissions
eNit for each country i and for each period of time t.
Table 6 gives the optimal non cooperative value function Nit for each country
during each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars. These results are
related with problem (P2). The last row gives the cumulated value function for
each country and the total of the world until the end of the horizon T , measured
in billions of 1990 USA dollars. Note that the Figure 4 shows the optimal non
cooperative value function Nit for each country i and per each period of time t in
billions of 1990 USA dollars.
Although optimal emissions increase with time for both cases, in the coopera-
tive case, see Figure 1, it is not a remarkable issue. Nevertheless, we discover an
increasing trend of the optimal emissions in the non cooperative case, as is shown
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Figure 4: Optimal Non Cooperative Value Function Nit per country i for
each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
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in Figure 3. As it is expected, the total of the optimal non cooperative emissions
for each country are bigger that the total of the optimal cooperative emissions as
is shown in Tables 3 and 5.
The total Optimal Cooperative Value Function is smaller than the total Opti-
mal Non Cooperative Value Function, as it is shown in Tables 4 and 6, and Figures
2 and 4. We observe that this result is consistent with what is obtained in the
seminal paper for the deterministic model provided by Germain, Toint, Tulkens,
and de Zeeuw (2003). In fact this result was expected after the definition of the
optimum.
We are now to compare the optimal stocks of pollutant. Table 7 gives the
cooperative optimal stock of pollutant, s∗t , the non cooperative optimal stock of
pollutant sNt and the differences between them at each period of time t in billion
tons of carbon. We observe a great improvement of the cooperative behavior with
respect to the non cooperative one over the time.
Figure 5 depicts the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative stocks of pol-
lutant, s∗t and s
N
t respectively for each period of time t in billion tons of carbon
equivalent.
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Figure 5: Optimal cooperative and non-cooperative stocks
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We observe in Figure 5 that the optimal stock cooperative s∗t decreases faster
than the non-cooperative stocks sNt . This result is consistent with the expected
behavior of the solutions of problems (P1) and (P2).
We have checked our model in different scenarios by changing the values of
the noise process parameters including the deterministic case, ( i.e. E[ξt] = 0,
V ar[ξt] = 0). All the results we have found were consistent, and for the deter-
ministic case we have obtained optimal stationary strategies for both problems P1
and P2, as we expected.
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6 Conclusions and Extensions
We have developed a useful stochastic formulation which extends the stock pollu-
tant control model developed by Germain, Toint, Tulkens, and de Zeeuw (2003).
Our model lets to include through the random disturbance term, random elements
not considered in the deterministic model. Moreover, our proposal lets to evaluate
the magnitud of this effects by estimating, for example, the variance of the additive
noise process. In principle we have assume independence for this process but we
can also extend our work by considering some time series structures for the noise
process.
Additionally, our example shows that the stochastic formulation produce con-
sistent results in comparison to the deterministic model of reference, but simul-
taneously provides more flexibility than the former one. Note that the example
proposed to illustrate our formulation is very close to the CLIMNEG model, which
has been in fact analyzed from the deterministic point of view. So, in somehow
we also extend this model to a stochastic setting. On the other hand, we want to
remark that our real data based example is strongly driven by the original values
taken at 1990 according to Kyoto Protocol.
Summarizing our results, for each country i ∈ J and each period t ∈ T we
obtain the following stocks pollution, emissions and values functions for each model
Cooperative Model (P1): Pareto equilibrium
{s∗t }, {e
∗
it}, {Wi(t, s
∗
t−1)}.
Non-Cooperative Model (P2): Nash equilibrium
{sNt }, {e
N
it }, {Ni(t, s
N
t−1)}.
One might think an extension of our stochastic model by considering mone-
tary transfers to induce cooperation, having in mind the significative differences
between the optimal cooperative and non cooperative stock pollutant pointed out
in our example, see for instance Figure 5.
Stochastic performance criteria based on bounds of probability could be also
considered, as an extension of this work.
Finally, further research could be done if we consider uncertainty about the
random perturbation, say the variance of the i.i.d. sequence. We propose to
estimate the parameter recursively and to include the estimation in the stochastic
control problem.
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Table 3: Optimal cooperative emissions e∗it for each country i at each period
of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
0 1.3700 0.2920 0.8720 0.8050 1.0660 3.4300 7.8350
1 1.4573 0.3661 0.9403 0.8369 1.1023 3.5168 8.2197
2 1.4059 0.3216 0.9617 0.8730 1.1256 3.5182 8.2061
3 1.4072 0.3623 0.8965 0.9046 1.1240 3.4727 8.1673
4 1.4006 0.3836 0.9480 0.8734 1.1582 3.5268 8.2906
5 1.4143 0.3664 0.9715 0.8160 1.0721 3.5000 8.1402
6 1.3814 0.2980 0.8910 0.8709 1.0808 3.4965 8.0187
7 1.4415 0.3677 0.9579 0.8782 1.0752 3.4648 8.1851
8 1.4019 0.3702 0.9398 0.8229 1.1360 3.4410 8.1117
9 1.4435 0.3138 0.9263 0.8455 1.1521 3.5200 8.2012
10 1.4069 0.3841 0.8962 0.8128 1.1143 3.5015 8.1157
11 1.3907 0.3505 0.8837 0.8911 1.1608 3.4809 8.1577
12 1.4373 0.3208 0.9604 0.9003 1.1176 3.4383 8.1748
13 1.3754 0.3321 0.8722 0.8874 1.1500 3.4314 8.0485
14 1.4040 0.3510 0.9323 0.8341 1.1012 3.5088 8.1315
15 1.4534 0.3642 0.8962 0.8516 1.1240 3.4941 8.1835
16 1.4266 0.3078 0.9349 0.9028 1.0691 3.4667 8.1079
17 1.4019 0.3747 0.8767 0.8520 1.0897 3.5128 8.1077
18 1.3850 0.3839 0.9637 0.8201 1.0878 3.4709 8.1114
19 1.3748 0.3430 0.8802 0.8494 1.0983 3.4988 8.0446
20 1.4651 0.3080 0.9586 0.8524 1.1605 3.4766 8.2213
21 1.4096 0.3621 0.9591 0.8101 1.1035 3.5196 8.1640
22 1.4058 0.2926 0.8770 0.8111 1.0901 3.4636 7.9401
23 1.4165 0.3153 0.9127 0.8053 1.1259 3.5227 8.0984
24 1.3790 0.3626 0.8883 0.8259 1.0720 3.4557 7.9836
25 1.3729 0.3153 0.8741 0.8596 1.0896 3.4996 8.0111
26 1.3705 0.3150 0.9062 0.8864 1.0667 3.4784 8.0233
27 1.4606 0.3087 0.9377 0.8184 1.1468 3.4630 8.1353
28 1.3706 0.3667 0.9465 0.8606 1.0907 3.4478 8.0829
29 1.4518 0.3075 0.8794 0.8262 1.1036 3.4711 8.0396
30 1.4024 0.3371 0.9284 0.8578 1.1453 3.4994 8.1706
31 1.3755 0.3113 0.9312 0.8280 1.1051 3.4988 8.0499
32 1.4095 0.3581 0.9278 0.8626 1.1300 3.4822 8.1702
33 1.4138 0.3585 0.9186 0.8529 1.0737 3.5033 8.1209
34 1.3879 0.3144 0.8818 0.8241 1.1575 3.5139 8.0797
35 1.4239 0.3040 0.9488 0.8358 1.1447 3.4466 8.1038
36 1.4388 0.3716 0.9129 0.8765 1.1241 3.4689 8.1928
37 1.3743 0.3092 0.9545 0.8749 1.1468 3.4918 8.1516
38 1.4264 0.3758 0.8998 0.9008 1.1369 3.4564 8.1960
39 1.4501 0.3712 0.9478 0.8423 1.1314 3.5167 8.2595
40 1.3826 0.3748 0.9176 0.8873 1.1243 3.4344 8.1210
Total 56.3971 13.7018 36.8385 34.1218 44.6082 139.3719 325.0393
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Table 4: Optimal Cooperative Value Function Wit per country i for each
period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
1 10.369 3.045 11.474 0.791 0.822 40.105 66.607
2 23.705 9.996 26.217 2.116 2.566 80.578 145.178
3 46.273 22.435 56.221 4.111 5.107 114.704 248.851
4 74.977 38.791 93.267 7.221 8.481 155.732 378.469
5 110.474 56.526 136.585 11.066 12.790 215.051 542.492
6 150.045 77.489 185.374 15.534 17.407 281.586 727.435
7 193.445 101.335 241.070 20.622 22.536 392.502 971.510
8 242.665 125.296 302.217 26.312 28.053 433.630 1158.172
9 289.747 151.391 358.967 32.281 33.853 575.998 1442.238
10 337.331 175.750 419.299 38.329 39.610 709.607 1719.925
11 385.025 199.606 476.437 44.817 44.978 785.260 1936.124
12 432.906 222.136 530.729 50.773 50.390 892.969 2179.902
13 474.958 242.581 580.072 57.794 55.083 1015.229 2425.717
14 512.754 260.732 623.311 63.756 59.215 1126.005 2645.772
15 545.188 277.428 658.670 69.500 62.971 1208.345 2822.102
16 573.908 289.570 691.630 74.551 65.994 1275.034 2970.687
17 601.616 299.142 718.567 78.833 69.498 1386.343 3153.998
18 623.185 307.191 738.315 83.789 70.964 1379.837 3203.282
19 636.706 311.093 748.382 87.706 72.697 1507.285 3363.869
20 646.949 316.818 757.791 90.567 74.612 1414.530 3301.268
21 656.947 315.800 761.817 93.821 74.647 1462.772 3365.805
22 660.043 313.585 759.360 96.347 75.480 1496.716 3401.530
23 654.250 310.591 751.377 98.160 73.763 1518.743 3406.884
24 645.977 305.770 739.954 98.828 72.478 1537.814 3400.821
25 633.975 297.621 721.166 99.575 71.054 1557.018 3380.409
26 623.530 288.232 700.424 101.497 69.405 1540.371 3323.459
27 605.082 277.149 677.445 99.436 67.152 1515.212 3241.477
28 581.221 263.688 638.926 96.741 64.914 1480.543 3126.033
29 560.102 250.809 618.510 95.807 61.931 1421.172 3008.332
30 540.727 241.449 596.758 95.131 59.797 1356.449 2890.311
31 514.518 227.031 564.016 93.019 56.418 1352.034 2807.036
32 482.633 217.063 528.249 88.252 53.187 1322.749 2692.133
33 462.261 201.736 492.236 85.544 51.605 1216.818 2510.199
34 439.454 188.740 473.924 83.498 48.224 1152.185 2386.026
35 404.442 178.001 440.403 77.556 46.016 1092.967 2239.386
36 389.319 171.133 415.472 76.438 42.149 1010.633 2105.144
37 363.086 171.140 392.953 75.772 41.336 880.546 1924.833
38 356.628 162.549 386.854 74.481 40.175 831.407 1852.094
39 329.668 150.447 356.566 68.723 37.583 965.291 1908.279
40 315.541 147.684 345.070 69.529 37.492 804.884 1720.200
Total 17131.631 8168.569 19716.072 2628.625 1942.436 40506.656 90093.990
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Table 5: Optimal non cooperative emissions eNit for each country at each
period of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
0 1.3700 0.2920 0.8720 0.8050 1.0660 3.4300 7.8350
1 1.6936 0.3297 1.0815 0.9466 1.1932 4.8111 10.0556
2 1.7369 0.3093 1.0601 0.9934 1.2411 5.2140 10.5549
3 1.8079 0.3495 1.1240 1.0208 1.2706 5.3799 10.9526
4 1.8647 0.3708 1.1569 1.0952 1.3004 5.4845 11.2725
5 1.9336 0.3616 1.1757 1.1651 1.3533 5.6815 11.6707
6 1.9872 0.3573 1.1840 1.2277 1.3755 5.8461 11.9778
7 2.0505 0.3855 1.2348 1.3000 1.4118 6.4445 12.8270
8 2.1349 0.3713 1.2890 1.3697 1.4400 6.1295 12.7344
9 2.1930 0.4059 1.3035 1.4440 1.4940 6.9994 13.8398
10 2.2653 0.4169 1.3646 1.5154 1.5496 7.6107 14.7225
11 2.3415 0.4262 1.4038 1.6046 1.5801 7.7593 15.1154
12 2.4388 0.4363 1.4455 1.6626 1.6325 8.1749 15.7907
13 2.5168 0.4483 1.4887 1.8007 1.6683 8.7246 16.6475
14 2.5943 0.4613 1.5284 1.8951 1.7009 9.2275 17.4075
15 2.6619 0.4818 1.5525 1.9965 1.7420 9.6005 18.0353
16 2.7330 0.4817 1.5957 2.0837 1.7663 9.9276 18.5880
17 2.8491 0.4917 1.6536 2.1720 1.8722 10.5902 19.6287
18 2.9394 0.5020 1.6906 2.3074 1.8779 10.6086 19.9261
19 3.0297 0.5131 1.7288 2.4412 1.9538 11.5005 21.1672
20 3.0989 0.5397 1.7645 2.5294 2.0352 11.0784 21.0461
21 3.2049 0.5342 1.8076 2.6697 2.0574 11.6166 21.8905
22 3.3017 0.5416 1.8511 2.8143 2.1482 12.1397 22.7966
23 3.3693 0.5614 1.8921 2.9590 2.1435 12.6529 23.5781
24 3.4505 0.5830 1.9419 3.0895 2.1831 13.2212 24.4691
25 3.5378 0.5954 1.9804 3.2576 2.2443 13.8653 25.4807
26 3.6605 0.6113 2.0297 3.4956 2.3156 14.3480 26.4608
27 3.7451 0.6215 2.0785 3.6108 2.3686 14.8227 27.2472
28 3.7994 0.6142 2.0474 3.7109 2.4270 15.2640 27.8629
29 3.8773 0.6104 2.1191 3.8951 2.4512 15.5554 28.5083
30 3.9754 0.6441 2.1863 4.1071 2.5262 15.8186 29.2578
31 4.0398 0.6378 2.2058 4.2885 2.5466 16.6141 30.3326
32 4.0601 0.6735 2.2061 4.3691 2.5741 17.2457 31.1286
33 4.1586 0.6465 2.1817 4.5336 2.6893 17.2203 31.4300
34 4.2358 0.6312 2.2762 4.7429 2.6952 17.5216 32.1029
35 4.1714 0.6324 2.2456 4.7126 2.7592 17.8291 32.3502
36 4.2945 0.6870 2.2613 4.9778 2.6721 17.7925 32.6852
37 4.2009 0.7584 2.2238 5.1995 2.7869 16.2654 31.4349
38 4.1874 0.6889 2.2102 5.1854 2.7111 13.3914 28.3744
39 4.0943 0.6202 2.1070 4.8804 2.6863 19.5576 33.9458
40 3.8903 0.6632 2.0420 5.2317 2.8560 16.0003 30.6835
Total 124.1258 20.9963 69.7200 114.3020 81.3007 465.5356 875.9806
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Table 6: Optimal Non Cooperative Value Function Nit for each country i for
each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
1 5.060 5.840 6.771 0.475 0.607 7.933 26.685
2 19.428 11.189 26.000 1.898 2.370 31.620 92.504
3 43.100 25.930 56.806 4.292 5.235 71.063 206.425
4 75.349 45.255 98.798 7.665 9.140 125.683 361.891
5 115.923 65.951 151.237 12.265 14.113 196.021 555.510
6 164.689 91.649 213.453 17.588 20.000 281.700 789.078
7 219.679 122.344 283.644 24.085 26.765 381.763 1058.279
8 282.161 155.795 361.848 32.230 34.084 496.270 1362.387
9 349.473 191.702 446.515 40.716 42.213 621.860 1692.479
10 423.470 231.095 537.756 51.094 51.246 762.281 2056.942
11 501.907 271.616 633.719 60.638 60.394 914.520 2442.794
12 582.701 314.348 732.073 72.192 70.568 1078.521 2850.404
13 670.695 358.674 837.529 85.196 80.669 1253.131 3285.894
14 758.073 403.696 941.222 100.204 91.882 1432.802 3727.879
15 846.312 449.146 1048.522 114.325 102.467 1623.335 4184.106
16 939.339 496.081 1154.979 128.342 114.587 1822.981 4656.309
17 1033.522 541.159 1264.911 146.118 125.492 2025.461 5136.663
18 1127.862 586.757 1368.316 164.338 136.879 2237.544 5621.696
19 1222.511 632.460 1478.109 181.050 148.047 2451.760 6113.936
20 1308.225 677.369 1576.073 199.063 157.745 2667.923 6586.399
21 1401.983 718.263 1675.835 219.710 169.977 2883.851 7069.619
22 1494.404 764.775 1781.170 239.493 181.545 3114.149 7575.536
23 1581.518 803.590 1873.400 259.723 191.216 3332.866 8042.313
24 1672.016 841.284 1968.219 279.329 203.507 3564.322 8528.677
25 1757.224 881.467 2058.035 298.552 213.239 3786.392 8994.909
26 1839.201 917.556 2139.636 318.380 224.032 4011.689 9450.494
27 1907.954 951.243 2214.529 342.946 230.629 4230.270 9877.570
28 1990.590 979.139 2287.867 362.215 241.658 4449.010 10310.478
29 2055.345 1013.474 2364.149 385.946 250.034 4664.065 10733.013
30 2126.256 1037.725 2422.633 405.758 256.618 4869.331 11118.321
31 2195.015 1066.505 2484.037 429.626 266.211 5080.226 11521.619
32 2251.363 1085.618 2538.383 449.499 272.596 5282.732 11880.192
33 2308.942 1107.414 2590.563 472.219 282.141 5481.463 12242.741
34 2367.816 1132.143 2642.893 496.390 285.541 5680.213 12604.995
35 2416.267 1152.267 2679.950 518.215 292.525 5881.186 12940.409
36 2461.812 1161.568 2720.958 538.015 299.275 6065.006 13246.633
37 2514.893 1182.822 2752.021 560.599 303.991 6248.382 13562.708
38 2550.685 1189.119 2788.440 581.490 309.679 6431.110 13850.523
39 2585.639 1200.261 2808.867 607.007 314.701 6597.569 14114.044
40 2633.175 1211.492 2839.462 627.551 320.025 6785.054 14416.758
Total 52801.575 26075.778 60849.327 9836.434 6403.642 118923.057 274889.812
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Table 7: Optimal stocks of pollutant cooperative s∗t and non cooperative s
N
t
and their differences for each period t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
t s∗
t
sN
t
Difference
0 590.0000 590.0000 0.0000
1 544.5887 546.4247 1.83592
2 503.2917 507.3095 4.01784
3 465.7098 472.1477 6.43787
4 431.6674 440.5019 8.83448
5 400.5691 412.1310 11.56194
6 372.1760 386.6461 14.47010
7 346.5303 364.3270 17.79666
8 323.1425 343.9441 20.80159
9 301.9700 326.5193 24.54933
10 282.6366 311.5612 28.92458
11 265.1027 298.3557 33.25308
12 249.1796 287.0259 37.84635
13 234.5776 277.5828 43.00516
14 221.3860 269.7580 48.37202
15 209.4455 263.2723 53.82673
16 198.5148 257.9288 59.41401
17 188.5776 254.1118 65.53429
18 179.5473 250.9391 71.39189
19 171.2710 249.2960 78.02505
20 163.9237 247.6811 83.75741
21 157.1870 247.0574 89.87035
22 150.8389 247.3965 96.55765
23 145.2260 248.4863 103.26028
24 140.0085 250.3680 110.35947
25 135.2929 253.0903 117.79739
26 131.0180 256.5451 125.52711
27 127.2437 260.4724 133.22862
28 123.7602 264.6583 140.89812
29 120.5500 269.1092 148.55920
30 117.7626 273.9050 156.14239
31 115.1078 279.3397 164.23183
32 112.8148 285.0763 172.26153
33 110.6808 290.5929 179.91211
34 108.6996 296.2809 187.58129
35 106.9226 301.6991 194.77650
36 105.3961 306.9598 201.56373
37 103.9672 310.4921 206.52493
38 102.7126 310.6428 207.93016
39 101.6355 316.3512 214.71562
40 100.5178 318.2784 217.76052
38
